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special is the size of this liquidity provision – making up 80% of all short term CHF liquidity 
provided by the SNB – and also the measures that were adopted to distribute this liquidity. 
In addition to making CHF available to other central banks via SWAP facilities, the SNB 
also allows banks domiciled outside Switzerland to directly participate in its REPO 
transactions. Although this policy was adopted for reasons that predate the financial crisis, 
during the crisis it proved tremendously helpful as it gave the European banking system 
direct access to the primary funding facility for CHF. 
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1.  Introduction 
In the years leading up to 2007, banks across the globe had dramatically increased their 
balance sheet exposure to foreign currencies, which caused a corresponding increase in 
demand for cross-border liquidity. With the onset of the financial crisis and the successive 
drying up of interbank markets, the private sector no longer provided  this liquidity, thus 
requiring a coordinated action by the world’s major central banks. 
In particular the provision of dollar liquidity to non-US banks by the Federal Reserve has 
received ample attention in the global financial press  (for a discussion see, for example, 
Goldberg et al. (forthcoming)). Much less noticed was the case of the Swiss National Bank’s 
(SNB) large scale provision of Swiss Franc (CHF) liquidity to the banking system across and 
beyond the European Union. 
In this note, we document the extent of the CHF liquidity provision and describe the means by 
which it was provided. What makes the Swiss case special is not only the size of the liquidity 
provision to banks domiciled outside Switzerland (at times making up 80% of all short term 
CHF liquidity provided by the SNB), but also the adopted measures to distribute this liquidity. 
In addition to providing CHF to other central banks via SWAP facilities, the SNB also allows 
foreign banks to directly participate in their REPO market. Although this policy was adopted 
for reasons that predate the financial crisis, during the crisis it proved tremendously helpful as 
it gave the European banking system direct access to the primary funding facility for CHF. 
Last, the Swiss case is exceptional since between March 2009 and June 2010, faced with 
deflation risks and zero interest rates, the SNB intervened in the foreign exchange market as 
part of its unconventional policies. The resulting large scale inflow of CHF to the financial 
sector flooded the international banking system with CHF liquidity, an effect so big that the 
need for liquidity funding in the SNB’s liquidity providing open market operations virtually 
ceased to exist. Thus, although not an objective of the foreign exchange interventions in itself, 
they may have contributed to stabilizing the European banking system. 
2.  The Origins: CHF Loans in Austria and CEE 
Owing to the traditionally  low interest rates in Switzerland  and the low exchange rate 
volatility observed since the introduction of the Euro, many households and firms across 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) relied on CHF-denominated loans as a source of cheap 
funding. The resulting aggregate exposure was substantial: by early 2009, households and 2 
 
non-banking sector firms in CEE economies had accumulated the equivalent of CHF 120 
billion worth of debt denominated in Swiss currency. In Austria, mostly due to its proximity 
to Switzerland, total exposure was then worth over CHF 80 billion. Also non-banks in the 
other richer countries of the Euro Zone relied on such loans and the total exposure of non-
Banks Swiss European banks amounted to around 400 billion CHF in late 2008. 
The size of the exposure has raised many concerns regarding the financial stability of the 
banking sector in case of continued CHF strength, most notably by Krugman (2009). Since 
few of the debtors have any CHF income, such an appreciation could cause large-scale default 
and the resulting loan losses could put at risk the banking sector in these economies under 
strain.
1
However, a  second  financial stability concern  related to the CHF  loans  has received 
surprisingly little attention (with the notable exception of Pann et al. (2010)), namely the 
resulting funding and liquidity risk that non-Swiss banks face. After all, CHF-denominated 
loans are cheaper than non-CHF currency-denominated loans because non-Swiss banks can 
obtain cheap CHF funding themselves. 
 
3.  Systemic CHF Shortages During the Crisis 
CHF denominated loans obtained by non-banks outside Switzerland are typically granted by 
non-Swiss banks, who in turn finance themselves by borrowing from financial institutions in 
Switzerland. As is the case in all bank business, these non-Swiss banks give out long term 
loans, yet finance themselves on a short term basis. Their ability to roll over maturing CHF 
positions  came under stress when the interbank money  market successively dried  up 
following the onset of the financial crisis in August 2007 and, in particular, after the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 (see Guggenheim et al. (2011)). 
In international currency markets, any bank can potentially obtain financing in any foreign 
currency by either directly going to the interbank money market or by obtaining funds from 
its central bank and swapping the received funds into the foreign currency. In principle, the 
latter two ways should ensure that irrespective of the market where a currency is lent from 
one bank to another, the rate at which this is done is the same.  
                                                 
1 The aggregate exposure of CEE and Austria to low-interest rate currencies had already caused losses of around 60 billion 
USD for these nations in 2008-2009 alone, see Auer and Wehrmüller (2009). Note that empirical studies by Brown et al. 
(2009) and Puhr et al. (2009) show that the debtors tend to be rather solvent, so that these concerns are less relevant than the 
sheer magnitude of the exposure suggests. 3 
 
During the recent financial crisis, however, interbank money markets have temporarily not 
functioned smoothly. For example, Figure 1 documents the strains in the CHF money market 
arising in October 2008. The figure plots the difference between the unsecured and secured 
overnight interbank rate for CHF funds. While these two spreads are historically rather low 
and co-move closely, the spread on CHF rose steeply during October 2008, reaching values 
up to 300 basis points. Figure 1 also plots the spread between the unsecured and secured 
overnight interbank rate for euro funds, where no such spike occurred. 
 
Figure  1  plots the evolution of the difference between the unsecured and secured overnight 
interbank rate for CHF funds and for euro funds from August to November of 2008. The two 
horizontal lines correspond to the announcement (bright blue line) and the actual start (dark blue 
line) of CHF auctions by the ECB, MNB, and NBP. Source: See Auer and Kraenzlin (2009) 
The CHF specific spike in the cost of obtaining unsecured funds was caused by a combination 
of the need of banks  domiciled outside Switzerland  to continuously roll over maturing 
interbank loans and the drying up of supply for these funds. In a calm market environment, all 
Swiss domestics banks, as well as a considerable number banks of domiciled outside 
Switzerland that do have access to the Swiss REPO system, would have immediately 
exploited this profit opportunity and provided unsecured funds to banks without access to the 















However, against the backdrop of the global financial crisis and the fear of counterparty 
default risk, this did not happen and the spread between secured and unsecured CHF funds 
remained elevated for several trading days. Without access to the Swiss Repo system, even 
banks with ample collateral could not obtain secured funding, as the SNB was not able to 
provide liquidity directly to these banks. 
The problems in the cross-border interbank market could have posed a substantial danger to 
the stability of the financial sector at large. If the Swiss banking system was no longer willing 
to supply liquidity to banks across the euro zone and CEE, non-Swiss banks in turn could try 
to reduce their exposure by liquidating CHF loans they had given out to their clients. Given 
the tensions in banking at the time, this would have driven many debtors into default, and 
could have started a process of unorderly wind down of CHF loans, with increasing default 
rates implying the need for additional loan-loss provisions and thus increasing pressure to 
liquidate CHF exposure. This vicious cycle could have had dire consequences for the banking 
system and the real economy. 
4.  Phase I: Inter Central Bank SWAP Facilities  
The drying up of liquidity distribution in foreign currency posed a problem more challenging 
than the breakdown of the domestic interbank money market: no central bank can on its own 
provide liquidity  in a foreign currency. First, the European Central Bank  (ECB)  and  the 
central banks in CEE obviously cannot create CHF liquidity. Second, the SNB can create 
Swiss Franc liquidity but not supply this liquidity to banks that do not have access to the 
Swiss Repo System or banks that do not have sufficient SNB eligible collateral, which in 
2007 was the case for most banks involved in CHF-denominated lending in CEE.
2
To overcome this market friction, the SNB jointly announced with the ECB and subsequently 
with the Narodowy Bank Polski and the Magyar Nemzeti Bank that all these central banks 
would directly distribute CHF denominated funds to their counterparties. Since nearly all 
banks who have to fund some CHF exposure are registered with one of the four central banks 
and also since the conditions at which these funds are auctioned are similar across these 




                                                 
2 In general, the establishment of access to the Swiss REPO system takes several months. Hence, banks with Swiss franc 
exposure but no access to the Swiss REPO System could not establish access in mean time.  
 
3 The Hungarian Central Bank offered slightly different conditions. See Goldberg et al. (2010) and Aizenman and Pasricha 
(2009) for a discussion of various SWAP line agreements around the globe 5 
 
As can clearly be made out from Figure 1, on the value date of the first SWAP transaction, the 
CHF  tensions in the unsecured money  market ceased once the first CHF  auctions were 
implemented by the partner central banks. 
Figure 2 documents the extent to which banks domiciled in the European union used the 
SNB-ECB SWAP facility. Starting with the introduction, demand for CHF in the Euro Zone 
immediately jumped to around CHF 40 billion and stayed there for around half a year. 
Thereafter, demand for the money from this facility levelled off and ceased during January 
2010.  
 
Figure 2: Volume of CHF Delivered to Euro Zone Banks Via the SNB-ECB Swap Facility 
5.  Phase II: Enhancing Foreign Banks’ direct access to the REPO 
System 
Figure 1 demonstrates that the SNB-ECB SWAP was a functioning measure to address short 
run liquidity mismatches. Since they are just a means to distribute liquidity more effectively, 
they involve no direct costs, but they still have limits. First, their maximum volume is agreed 
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bank. Second, the SWAP agreement itself to some extent fractionalizes the market for CHF 
liquidity since the total supply of CHF is split across different selling platforms.
4
Last,  they involve also some loss of control over monetary policy since  in essence, the 
monetary base is partly controlled by a foreign central bank. The main worry of policymakers 
is that such SWAP agreements could create inflationary pressure since opening new means to 
distribute liquidity can increase the total supply of money.  For example, the maximum 
amount of a SWAP is being agreed upon for several months in advance. Since the receiving 
central bank may auction off the maximum amount but is not obliged to do so, the uncertainty 
in the growth of the money supply is increased.
 
5
Given these shortcomings, the SNB, the ECB and the Euro Zone member central banks, as 
well as all other affected central banks advised banks with major exposure to the CHF to seek 
access to the SNB’s REPO system.
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This pre-crisis policy also proved useful in addressing cross-border liquidity shortages during 
the financial turmoil. The black solid line in Figure 3 plots the evolution of the number of 
banks in the REPO System that are domiciled outside Switzerland (right axis). As of mid 
November 2010, 59 such banks had established access to the Eurex Repo electronic trading 
platform, a necessary condition to participate in the SNB’s repo auctions. Of these 59 banks, 
23 where domiciled in Austria, 16 in Germany, and 6 in the UK.
 The original intention of allowing foreign banks to access the Swiss REPO 
system was to reduce the dependence on the few large Swiss financial institutions, to improve 
the general liquidity, and to thereby facilitate the steering of a longer term money market rate, 
namely the 3-months Swiss franc LIBOR.  
8
                                                 
4 A further potential worry is that these agreements could entail a larger counterparty default risk. This is not the case. First, 
there is no risk involved for the central bank handing out the funds, since the receiving central banks guarantee these 
transactions. Second, there is also no effect on counterparty default risk for the receiving central bank since it transacts with 
its regular counterparties against the regular collateral basket. 
 
5 There are, however, two main reasons why the loss of monetary supply is rather contained. First, the central bank that is 
originating the funds can sterilize the effect on the monetary supply by issuing own debt certificates or conducting liquidity 
absorbing open market operations. While giving away some control over monetary policy to other central banks is of little 
concern in the current low-inflation environment, such concerns will definitely become a first order political topic once 
inflationary pressures pick up and central banks have to refocus on their core task of maintaining price stability. 
6 In particular, the Austrian financial authorities (Austrian National Bank and the Finanzmarktaufsicht) have assumed a key 
role in persuading commercial banks in Austria to seek access to the Swiss Repo system. 
7 The REPO system that the SNB uses is also the same system where the majority of interbank CHF repo transactions are 
concluded. Hence, even banks without access to the SNB could use the interbank repo market for refinancing purposes. 
8 The SNB also accepts securities denominated in foreign currency. High credit standards as well as a highly 
efficient risk management procedure eventually imply that the SNB does not apply haircuts. Banks domiciled 7 
 
Figure 3 also documents the volume of CHF liquidity that these foreign-domiciled banks 
obtained directly from the SNB. The latter volume (blue solid line, see left axis) temporarily 
exceeded CHF 50 billion.  
To make clear just how sizeable the foreign demand for liquidity is, Figure 3 also documents 
the volume of CHF liquidity that was obtained from the SNB via the REPO system by Swiss 
banks. During nearly all months in 2009 and also in early 2010, well over 70% of all liquidity 
demand actually came from outside Switzerland. Add to this the money obtained indirectly 
via the SNB-ECB swap implies that at times, nearly 90% of short term CHF liquidity was 
held by non-Swiss Banks.  
 
Figure 3 Use of SNB REPO by banks domiciled in and outside Switzerland 
 
Figure 4 again underpins the importance of direct access to the SNB’s REPO system for 
banks domiciled outside Switzerland (see also Kraenzlin and von Scarpatetti (2011)). This 
figure presents an area diagram (stacked) showing total provision of CHF liquidity to banks 
domiciled outside Switzerland. The volume supplied via the REPO system (in red) and the 
volume supplied via the SNB-ECB Swap (in blue). 
                                                                                                                                                         
outside Switzerland thus have the possibility to repo out non-CHF denominated securities with the SNB. It is 
unclear to what extent this possibility has contributed to the high use of the SNB REPO facility by this group of 
































































Use of SNB REPO By Domestic and Foreign Banks 
Banks outside Switzerland Banks in Switzerland No. of Foreign REPO Participants (Right Axis)8 
 
 Figure 4 Total liquidity provision to Banks domiciled outside Switzerland 
6.  Phase III: Exchange Rate Interventions 
Figures 3 and 4 document the extent of the CHF shortage during 2008 and 2009, but also, that 
this demand decreased substantially staring in mid 2009; it even vanished completely in mid 
2010.  Although one might be tempted to attribute  this to a resurgence of activity in the 
interbank money market, this is not fully the case.  
Rather,  starting in March 2009, the SNB intervened in the foreign exchange market, 
eventually building up a foreign reserve position worth over CHF 200 billion, compared to a 
pre-2009 level of less than CHF 50 billion. 
While the exchange rate interventions were part of the SNB’s unconventional measures to 
avert deflation risks in Switzerland, an unintended side effect of the interventions was the 
resolution of the international  CHF liquidity shortage: the 150 billion of additional CHF 
supply is now available to banking system and consequently, the majority of banks are awash 
with CHF liquidity. 
Figure 5 puts the extent of the liquidity  provision via the exchange rate interventions in 
perspective. The figure displays the total supply of CHF liquidity supplied to both banks 
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Swiss REPO system (blue area), the EURCHF-Swaps (red area), and last, the SNB exchange 




Figure 5: Total Supply of CHF Liquidity 
Figure 5 documents that the exchange rate interventions where so sizeable that they in effect 
created  enough  liquidity  so  that demand for liquidity via REPO and  SWAP  transactions 
ceased to exist altogether. In fact, currently the SNB absorbs liquidity to implement monetary 
policy. This is done, on the one hand, through weekly issuance of the SNB’s own money 
market bills (SNB Bills) and on the other through daily one-week REPO auctions. 
The exchange rate intervention were thus also helpful from a financial stability perspective. 
Using loans denominated in a low interest rate currency such as the CHF is in essence a carry 
trade strategy. Such strategies are always subject to a certain danger of a disorderly unwinding 
of positions: if the losses stemming from an appreciation of the CHF become too large such 
that counterparty default risks surface, carry traders can no longer re-finance their positions 
and have to liquidate them; this, in turn, causes a further appreciation of the CHF. The 
combination of SWAP facilities, enhancing direct access to the primary source of Swiss franc 
liquidity, as well as the exchange rate interventions were instrumental in making sure that 
such sizable unwinding of positions did not take place to date and is also unlikely to happen in 
the near future. 
                                                 












Apr 07 Jul 07 Oct 07 Jan 08 Apr 08 Jul 08 Oct 08 Jan 09 Apr 09 Jul 09 Oct 09 Jan 10 Apr 10 Jul 10 Oct 10
Total Supply of CHF Liquidity
Volume EURCHF-SWAP Total REPO Volume Increase in Foreign Reserves Compared to 03 2009
CHF billion10 
 
7.  Conclusion 
When liquidity demand spikes, small frictions in the private sectors' way to distribute liquidity 
internationally can have large effects on the interest rate paid.  
The rapid, coordinated, and large policy response by central banks across Europe may has 
avoided an unorderly winding down of the carry trade positions that European households and 
firms had built up in the years leading up to the crisis.  
International liquidity mismatches involving Swiss  francs  are  currently  of little concern, 
which may be an unintended side effect of the liquidity injection via the SNB’s interventions 
in the foreign exchange market. At the current juncture, the private sector thus has won time 
to reduce its CHF exposure in an orderly way. 
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